My research is situated at the intersection of cognitive and social psychology. I am particularly interested in a variety of issues in moral psychology, including whether people think of their moral beliefs as objective facts, or alternatively as subjective preferences; how people place value on different human lives; how people perceive moral character in others' and how that affects their attitudes and judgments; what drives the motivation to punish acts of harm or wrong-doing (including those carried out by non-humans, e.g., animals); and what predicts whether people are willing to take "neuro-enhancement" technologies that aim to improve aspects of their psychological functioning. I am also working on a set of projects on deductive reasoning and inference.
Psychology Graduate Group
Goodwin, G. P., & Darley, J. (2012). Why are some moral beliefs seen as more objective than others? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 250-256.
Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2011). Mental models of Boolean concepts. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 34-59.
Royzman, E. B., Goodwin, G.P., & Leeman, R. F. (2011). When sentimental rules collide: “Norms with feelings” in the dilemmatic context. Cognition, 121, 101-114.
Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2010). Conceptual illusions. Cognition, 114, 253-265.
Laham, S. M., Alter, A., & Goodwin, G. P. (2009). Easy on the mind, easy on the wrongdoer: Discrepantly easy to process violations are deemed less morally wrong. Cognition, 112(3):462-66.
Goodwin, G. P., & Darley, J. M. (2008). The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism. Cognition, 106, 1339-1366.
Riis, J., Simmons, J. P., & Goodwin, G. P. (2008). Preferences for psychological enhancements. Journal of Consumer Research, 35, 495-508.
Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2008). Transitive and pseudo-transitive inferences. Cognition, 108, 320-352.
Goodwin, G. P., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2005). Reasoning about relations. Psychological Review, 112, /468-493.